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   "Assault Weapons" Revisited -- An Analysis of the AMA Report.
    (C) by Edgar A. Suter, MD, Chairman, Doctors for Integrity in
    Research & Public Policy
    CIS:73407,3647
    uploaded at Dr. Suter's request 2/24/94.
   Abstract

   The AMA Council on Scientific Affairs did not conduct a
rigorous scientific evaluation before supporting a ban on
assault weapons. The Council appears to have unquestioningly
accepted common misperceptions and even partisan
misrepresentations regarding the nature and uses of assault
weapons. This article examines the pivotal issues and
proposes a rational approach to gun control and more
effectual measures to reduce violence in our society.

   Introduction

   On the basis of a single study of gun trace data, the AMA
Council on Scientific Affairs has endorsed a ban on assault
weapons.(1)  A review of available literature suggests the
Council has not considered the majority of scholarship
available. The sole study offered by the Council in support
of their position was based on gun trace data, even though
the Council fleetingly acknowledged that gun "trace" data is
not representative of criminal gun use. A remarkable
preponderance of data actually suggests that the misuse of
assault weapons has been exaggerated. In the worst hotbeds of
drug and violent crime such guns are used in generally 0% to
3% of gun crime. The Council understated the legitimate uses
of assault weapons, including hunting, self-protection, and
target competition. The Council also failed to explain the
significance of pivotal technical matters; such as, assault
weapons cannot be distinguished by meaningful criteria from
their "sporting" counterparts and assault weapons do not have
greater magazine capacity, rapid fire capability, or
lethality than their "sporting" counterparts.
   Finally, the Council dismissed the constitutional
impediments to assault weapon bans without good authority.
Public policy on guns and violence should couple effectual
controls with realistic goals.

   Definition problems

   A consistent definition of "assault weapon," if possible,
would be key to amassing and collating data and to regulating
such weapons. By 1988, however, the California Attorney
General's expert had already concluded such a definition was
technically impossible.(2)
   The terms "assault rifle" and "assault weapon" are not
interchangeable. Assault rifles are machine guns. Assault
rifles are called "automatic" weapons because the loading and
firing of a fresh cartridge is automatic as long as
ammunition remains and the trigger is depressed. Such weapons
have been common since the Wehrmacht's World War II
introduction of the MKB(H)42. Though legal under federal law
and under the statutes of 46 states, machine-gun ownership
has been strictly regulated since the National Firearms Act
of 1934 and, according to the recent Director of the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), Stephen Higgins,
there are perhaps one or two documented misuses of machine
guns in the last 60 years by their legal owners.
   Though sometimes cosmetically similar, "assault weapons"
are not machine-guns. Assault weapons encompass an amorphous
group of guns that can only fire a single shot with each
squeeze of the trigger. Assault weapons are functionally
identical to other common hunting and target rifles such as
the Remington 7400, Valmet Hunter, Ruger Ranch Rifle,
Springfield Armory National Match target rifle, and many
others. The reloading of a fresh cartridge is automatic, but
the firing is not, hence all these guns are "semi-automatic."
Semi-automatic weapons have been common since the development
of the Borchardt pistol in 1893.
   Typically assault weapons fire low or intermediate power
cartridges (e.g. 9mm Parabellum, 5.56x45mm, 7.62x39mm) with
non-expanding bullets that have been designed to wound rather
than kill.(3) Such cartridges are considerably less deadly
than most high-power hunting cartridges (e.g. .243
Winchester, 30-06, .300 Winchester Magnum) which, by
definition, are designed to kill, particularly when loaded
with expanding bullets.
   Assault weapons sometimes share cosmetic similarities with
military weapons, but the Council has not explained how
cosmetic features make some guns more deadly than
functionally identical weapons. Except for their "spray fire"
assertion discussed below, the Council has cited no data
demonstrating that a gun is more deadly by virtue of a
plastic stock, a pistol grip, a durable finish, a flash
suppressor, luminescent night sights, or a bayonet lug. While
cosmetic features such as these may have an ominous military
appearance to some, these features have little public health
relevance; after all, America is not suffering from an
epidemic of night bayonetings. How a person uses (or does not
use) a gun is far more important than how the gun looks.
   Even the capability of accepting "high capacity" magazines
is an unreliable distinction since most common semi-automatic
hunting and target rifles, including all those cited above,
are capable of accepting factory or after-market "high
capacity" magazines.
   Kleck, in Point Blank,  the encyclopedic 1991 review of
the literature on guns, violence, and gun control, makes the
public policy implications clear:
The difficulties with this political compromise (of
eliminating only some semi-automatic weapons) are obvious. If
semi-automatic fire and the ability to accept large magazines
are not important in crime, there is little reason to
regulate (assault weapons). On the other hand, if these are
important attributes, then it makes little crime control
sense (though ample political sense) to systematically
exclude from restriction the most widely owned models that
have these attributes, since this severely limits the impact
of regulation.(4)
   No functional features uniquely distinguish assault
weapons from their "sporting" counterparts. Because there is
no consistent definition, comparison of data from different
jurisdictions is impeded and legally defining assault weapons
as a class is impossible. Because the class cannot be
defined, the California and other bans have attempted to ban
guns by manufacturer and model. This approach has also
failed. Despite California's ban of over 60 models of assault
weapons, cosmetic changes in banned guns allow the legal sale
of functionally identical weapons. For example, substituting
a thumbhole stock for a pistol grip stock turns a banned "AK-
series" gun into an unrestricted MAK-90, a gun neither more
nor less lethal.
   One of the Council's sources, gun control advocate
Sugarmann, candidly stated that the public's confusion over
these weapons works to his political advantage:
The semiautomatic weapons' menacing looks, coupled with the
public's confusion over fully automatic machine guns versus
semiautomatic assault weapons - anything that looks like a
machine gun is assumed to be a machine gun - can only
increase that chance of public support for restrictions on
these weapons.(5)

   High capacity, rapid-fire, and lethality issues

   Whether or not a gun has a large ammunition capacity is
generally irrelevant because few criminals or police officers
even use the capacity of an old-fashioned "six-shooter." Of
course, the rare exceptions, such as the 1989 Stockton
incident and the 1993 "101 California Street" incident are,
because of their rarity, "newsworthy" and highly
sensationalized. For example, in the average 1989 New York
City shooting incident, the perpetrator fired 2.55 shots
(down from 2.66 in 1988), of which 11.8% hit someone.(6) The
situation is relatively unchanged in 1992 and, contrary to
frequent, but vague and unsubtantiated, assertions about the
police being "outgunned", the New York City Police fire 40%
more rounds per incident (3.92 with a hit percentage of 29%)
than criminals (2.76 with a hit percentage reduced to
8.2%).(7) As another example, in Philadelphia, fewer rounds
are fired from the average semi-automatic weapon used in
crime (1.6) than from the average revolver (1.9).(8) Such
data rebut the "spray fire" imagery of the Council.
   These figures undercut the Council's assertion of
increased criminal firepower from assault weapons. The
Council cited only anecdotal and unsubstantiated sources to
conclude: "Clearly the injuries from assault weapons are
taxing hospital emergency departments in large urban areas."
The authorities for the Council's assertions? Newspaper
articles in which a 5% increase in multiple gun shot cases
over 10 years was assumed, but not demonstrated, to be due to
assault weapons; a two day survey of one emergency room in
Los Angeles County embellished by anecdotes from four
surgeons; other articles that, without any evidence at all,
assumed, but did not demonstrate, the wounds they treated
were due to assault weapons; and a "background paper" from
the same California Attorney General's Office that denied the
existence of their 1988 Helsley(2) and 1991 Johnson(9)
studies documenting the minuscule prevalence of assault
weapons amongst crime guns. Even if an increased number of
multiple gun shot wounds were documented, it would be
important to determine whether more attacks involving
multiple assailants, as would be expected from the documented
increase in gang violence, were responsible for the problem,
rather than assuming that a change in criminal weapon
preference had occured.
   The Council writes "...assault weapons are meant to be spray
fired from the hip," citing a partisan source, Handgun
Control Inc., as authority. Though the Council cites Assault
Rifle Fact Sheet 1: Definitions and Background of the non-
partisan Institute for Research on Small Arms in
International Security for explanation of gun nomenclature,
the Council failed to concede that pertinent portions of the
Fact Sheet note these weapons are designed for aimed fire,
not "spray fire," and show that any person who shoots a semi-
automatic gun rapidly without aiming will rarely hit
anything.
   The Council repeated the erroneous claim that these
weapons are "easily converted to full automatic fire."
Current law requires that all guns undergo an extensive
evaluation by the federal firearms regulatory agency, BATF,
to prove that they cannot be easily converted to fully
automatic fire. In an April 3, 1989 New York Times article, a
BATF official stated that no gun available at that time could
be easily converted to machine-gun fire. A hint of the
infrequency of conversions can be gleaned from the
observation that about 6 of the 4,000 guns seized annually in
Los Angeles have evidence of attempted conversion.(10)
   Though some have claimed a particular lethality for
assault weapons, a literature review finds instead that
assault rifle and weapon wounds more closely approximate
handgun injuries than rifle injuries:
(M)any AK-47 shots will pass through the body causing no
greater damage than that produced by non-expanding handgun
bullets. The limited tissue disruption produced by this
weapon in the Stockton schoolyard is consistent with well
documented data from Vietnam... as well as with controlled
research studies from wound ballistic laboratories.(11)
   In general, it is the size and location of the wound that
determines the lethality of penetrating injuries. Whether
knife or gun, a small wound in a vital area can be deadly
where a much larger wound in a non-vital area may only
injure. A larger wound, of course, increases the chance of
encountering and injuring a vital structure. For firearms,
larger wounds are more likely from larger bullet diameter
("caliber"), from expanding bullets, and, in certain cases,
from tumbling, yawing, or fragmenting bullets. It is the
location and size of the permanent wound channel, the tissue
actually destroyed, that primarily determines lethality; the
effects of temporary stretching ("cavitation") of elastic
tissues or the sonic "shock wave" from a bullet's passage
have been greatly exaggerated.(12,13) Obtaining a wound in a
vital area, of course, depends upon shot placement which is a
reflection of marksmanship mitigated by chance; the more
skillful the marksman, the smaller the role of luck.
   Discredited theories relating kinetic energy or velocity
to wounding potential have no place in the scientific debate.
The Council repeated such myths about "high velocity"
bullets, "shock waves," "cavitation," and assault weapon
wound ballistics that have been definitively
dispelled.(11,12) The Council expressed its horror of the
single shock wave of a high velocity bullet, failing to note
that the average Extracorporeal Shock Wave Lithotripsy
utilizes about 2,000 shock wave pulses, each of which is
three times that of the "high velocity" bullet, without any
evidence whatsoever of soft tissue damage.(11) The vogue of
undue concern over "cavitation" in elastic human tissue has
justifiably passed, though without the Council's notice. The
Council cited a newspaper interview of a surgeon who thinks
inelastic watermelons are an appropriate human tissue
simulant.(14) If "watermelon wound ballistics" were valid,
deceleration injury from a one foot fall would similarly
crack human tissue. One must wonder whether the Council
wisely or carefully selected the best scholarship available.

   The unrepresentative nature of gun trace requests

   The only evidence offered by the Council that assault
weapons are a problem of the magnitude suggested by the media
are the Cox Newspaper articles. The Cox reporters used gun
trace requests to reach their refutable conclusion that 11%
of crime guns were assault weapons. While the Council
fleetingly acknowledged, "The sample of firearms for which
traces are requested is not likely to be representative of
all firearms used in crime," the Council uncritically
accepted the Cox article as best evidence despite over two
dozen studies presented below suggesting that the Cox figures
exaggerate the assault weapon problem by a factor of three to
one hundred ╨ or more, depending on the locale studied and
the definition of assault weapon used.
   Gun traces are not representative of the criminal
prevalence of gun use any more than the index of a research
journal reflects the prevalence of disease. Journal indices
and gun traces reflect a level of interest in the topic or
the gun. No study corroborates the Cox or other gun trace
data.
   In a Report For Congress on assault weapons, the
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress has
shown that the BATF gun trace system is inappropriate for
statistical purposes:
The (B)ATF tracing system is an operational system designed
to help law enforcement agencies identify the ownership path
of individual firearms. It was not designed to collect
statistics...
Two significant limitations should be considered when tracing
data are used for statistical purposes:
*     First, the firearms selected for tracing do not
constitute a random sample and cannot be considered
representative of the larger universe of all firearms used by
criminals, or of any subset of that universe. As a result,
data from the tracing system may not be appropriate for
drawing inferences such as which makes or models of firearms
are used for illicit purposes;
*     Second, standardized procedures do not exist to ensure
that officers use consistent definitions or terms in the
reports of circumstances that lead to each trace request.
Some trace requests do not even identify the circumstances
that resulted in the request.(15)
   No crime need be involved to initiate a gun trace, for
example, efforts to return stolen guns to rightful owners and
guns found incidental to other investigations are included
amongst gun traces. When a gun trace is tabulated as "related
to organized crime," it does not mean a crime was committed,
only that the officer requesting the trace suspected the gun
might be that of a gang or Mafia member.(15)
   The unreliable nature of gun traces is clear. For example,
in 1989 in Los Angeles, a hotbed of drug gangs and violent
crime, assault weapons represented approximately 3% guns
seized, but 19% of gun traces.(4)

   Other data

   There are limitations on sources of data other than gun
traces. The inconsistency of attempts to define assault
weapon in the few jurisdictions that, to date, have even made
the effort, makes data comparison difficult. Also, the
uncaptured guns of unsolved crimes cannot be represented
amongst either seized weapons or traced weapons. Compilations
of firearms forensics data are also hampered by incomplete
responses by a fraction of polled agencies.
   Despite these caveats, the preponderance of data currently
available indicates that assault weapons, even in the hotbeds
of violent crime, account for generally 0% to 3% of crime
guns(4) which approximately equals their estimated
representation amongst all guns in the USA.(16) This is shown
in essentially all studies and reports:

Jurisdiction - Data Year(s) - Findings

Akron(17) - 1989 - 2.0% of seized guns*
Baltimore City(18) - 1990 - 1.5% of seized and surrendered
guns
Baltimore County, MD(17) - 1990 - 0.3% of seized guns
Bexar County, TX (includes San Antonio)(19)
     - 1987 to 92 - 0.2% of homicides
     - 1987 to 92 - 0.0% of suicides
     - 1985 to 92 - 0.1% of seized guns
California(2) - 1987 - 2.3% of seized rifles**
California(9) - 1990 - 0.9% of seized guns
Chicago(20) - 1988 - 1.0% of seized guns
Chicago suburbs(21) - 1980 - 89 - 1.6% of seized guns
Connecticut(22) - 1988 to 92 - 1.8% of seized guns
Denver(23) - 1991 - 0.8% of seized guns
Florida State(24) - 1989 - 3.6% of seized guns**(also
documented declining use of assault weapons since 1981)
Miami(24)  - 1989 - 1.4% of homicides**
Miami(24)  - 1989 - 3.3% of seized guns**
Los Angeles(10) - 1989 - 3.0% of seized guns**
Massachusetts(25) - 1984 to 89 - 0.9% of homicides (study
excluded Boston)
Massachusetts(26) - 1988 - 1.9% of homicides
Massachusetts(25) - 1985 to 91 - 0.7% of all shootings
(including suicides)
Minneapolis(27) - 1987 to 89 - 0.3% of seized guns
New Jersey(28) - 1988 - 0.0% of homicides
New Jersey(29) - 1989 - 0.0% of homicides
New York City(30) - 1989 - 0.5% of seized guns
New York City(7) - 1992 - 0.0% of seized guns
Oakland(31) - 1990 - 3.9% of seized guns
Oakland(32) - 1991 - 3.7% of homicides
Philadelphia(8) - 1985 & 1990 - 0% of seized guns
San Diego(33) - 1988 to 90 - 0.3% of seized guns
San Francisco(17) - 1988 - 2.2% of seized guns
Washington, DC(34) - 1988 - 0.0% of seized guns
Washington, DC(35) - 1991 - 3.0% of seized guns
   * "seized" weapons were not necessarily used in crime
   ** assault weapon or assault rifle broadly defined
   In 1990 the Federal Bureau of Investigation noted that 12
0f 810 (1.48%) deaths of law enforcement officers during the
past decade involved assault weapons and also discussed the
dearth of information on the criminal use of these
firearms.(15) The US Department of Justice "Survey of State
Prison Inmates, 1991" suggests that less than 1% of inmates
had been armed with, though not necessarily used, a
"military-type weapon" (undefined) while committing the
offense for which they were incarcerated.(36) More New York
City police officers were attacked in 1992 with roach spray,
wood chisels, fire extinguishers, radio amplifiers, or any
other of a readily available array of household objects than
were attacked with assault weapons.(7)
   The Council has neither acknowledged the confounding
evidence, nor made an attempt to dispatch it. While none of
the studies cited can be claimed to epitomize the scientific
method, all but one of the studies suggest that claims about
assault weapons have been grossly exaggerated. A call for
better designed studies is appropriate, but, at the present
time, the Council's report founders with its sole datum from
the Cox Newspaper articles.
   Philip McGuire of Handgun Control Inc. has publicly stated
that assault weapons are not a problem, but he speculated
that they might become a problem in the future.(37) When
confronted with criticism regarding the lack of
substantiation, the Council has expressed similar fears that
assault weapons might become a problem.(19) What about such
potential problems? Since these weapons have been with us
from 30 to 100 years, there has been ample time for problems
to appear and to be documented by sound data.
   While there are important caveats  in considering any
current data and the definitive analysis of assault weapons
in crime has yet to be done, an objective individual is
justified in skepticism of deceptive and hysterical claims
that assault weapons are the "criminals' weapon of choice."

   Of what "legitimate" use are these assault weapons?

   Though responsible usage and safe storage of any firearm,
assault weapon or otherwise, injures no one, the "legitimate"
use of weapons is highly subjective. Hunters' views differ
from radical animal rights activists. There is even dissent
regarding the legitimacy of self-defense, for example,
certain religious groups in the forefront of the gun
prohibition lobby oppose the use of lethal force even in
defending one's life.(38)
   Certain features, such as ergonomic design, durability,
and high-capacity magazines, are noted amongst (though not
unique to) assault weapons and other functionally similar
weapons. Those features provoke the ire of prohibitionists,
but are features that make such weapons particularly suited
to popular target competitions, hunting, home defense,
defense against multiple assailants, community defense, and
self-protection in times of riot or natural disaster.
   An exact figure is unavailable, but the number of target
competitors, gun collectors, and legitimate owners of assault
weapons is at least 2 million and perhaps as high as 4
million.(16)

   Collecting, sport, and target competition

   Despite, or because of, their military origins, true
"assault rifles" and their cosmetic cousins, "assault
weapons," do appeal to the collector and the target shooter.
Assault weapons are increasingly used in national and
international target competitions sponsored by the
International Practical Shooting Confederation, the US
Practical Shooting Association, and other groups. The varied
and extended courses of fire and the movement of the target
or the shooter in these competitions demands the ergonomics
and capacity of assault weapons, even for the highly skilled
competitor. More traditional target matches using assault
weapons are sponsored by the US Government's National Board
for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, the Director of Civilian
Marksmanship (DCM), countless local gun clubs, and the NRA.
Those active in these competitions number over 35,000 (the
number of shooters rated and ranked for purposes of DCM
competitions alone). The DCM matches originated because the
armed services' national security mission was compromised by
the appalling marksmanship of recruits, a problem worsened in
the last three decades because recruits are a group
increasingly of urban background lacking in basic gun safety
and marksmanship skills. Additionally, the DCM matches were
the most cost-effective recruiting tool of the military until
1991 when Congressional anti-gun sentiment removed DCM
funding.(39) The DCM competitors and the US government
clearly consider these matches "legitimate sporting use."

   Hunting

   The plastic materials and protective metal finishes used
in military weapons of the last three decades have proven to
be particularly lightweight and durable. Though initially
proven on the battlefield (as sometimes occurs with advances
in trauma care), use of these materials is now common amongst
hunting rifles, semi-automatic and otherwise, apropos the
rough terrain, long hikes, and inclement weather associated
with hunting. One finds no fault with similar durable and
impact resistant materials when used in other tools, outdoor
equipment, and binoculars. Many hunters also need weapons
with high magazine capacity and rapid, follow-up shot
capability, for example, ranchers protecting their herds and
flocks from packs of predatory coyotes and farmers protecting
their crops from colonies of destructive gophers.

   Self protection and community defense

   Citizens have the natural right(38) and the common sense
duty to protect themselves, their families, their
communities, and their property. The use of assault weapons
by citizens in community defense can be demonstrated. Most
recently the Los Angeles riots made memorable the video
footage of law-abiding shop and homeowners using guns,
including assault weapons, to protect themselves, their
families, and their property. Determined display and
appropriate use of their protective weaponry was effective.
No major American city can claim freedom from similar riots
and the associated deaths and damage.
   As several national studies show, including the definitive
study by the National Institute of Justice(40) and studies
commissioned by gun-prohibitionist organizations, guns do
protect good people; they are used defensively by law-abiding
citizens at least 606,000 to 2.4 million times per year(4,41)
╨ as many as 75 lives protected by a gun for every life lost
to a gun ╨ lives saved, injuries prevented, medical costs
saved, and property protected.  This exceeds all estimates of
criminal misuse. Using a gun to resist a crime or assault is
safer than not resisting at all or resisting with means other
than firearms.(4) Guns not only repel crime, guns deter crime
as is shown by numerous surveys of criminals.(42) Arguably,
when faced with mob or gang violence or multiple assailants,
assault weapons represent the most appropriate means of
protection.
   Where the powerful images of children and innocent
bystanders injured by guns are concerned, any analysis of the
exaggerated extent of the problem is met with, "if it saves
only one life...." Since protective uses exceed criminal
misuses, a gun ban impacts more on compliant, good citizens
than upon criminals. One must admit, therefore, that a good
citizen's life lost because a gun was absent is at least as
valuable as a vicious predator's life lost because a gun was
present.

   The myths of police protection

   It has been argued than guns are not needed by citizens
because they are protected by the police and the military,
including the National Guard. In view of the current crime
rate, the effectiveness of that protection can be rightfully
questioned. A significant, if not majority, of police
activity involves "mopping up" after the crime has already
occurred. Research suggests that police apprehension offers
less deterrent to criminals than the threat of encountering
an armed victim.(42)
   Statutes(43) and legal precedents(44) are clear that the
police only have a responsibility to provide some general
level of protection to the community at large. Police are
under no obligation to protect any individual, even if in
immediate danger.(45) An oral promise to respond to an
emergency call for assistance does not make the police liable
to provide protection.(46)
   The withdrawal of police protection from riot-torn areas
of Los Angeles and the two day delay in putting National
Guard soldiers on the streets of Los Angeles exposed the
illusion of public protection. Additionally, it is disturbing
to recall that armed citizens had to protect themselves from
the police and US National Guard soldiers who were looting in
the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo.(47) Throughout American
history we have innumerable examples of crime, terrorism,
civil disorder, and natural disasters, where the police and
military forces have been unable or unwilling to protect
citizens, often for racist or political reasons.(48,49,50)
One can rightfully question the wisdom of reliance upon the
police or military in times of trouble.

   Constitutional issues

   While certain state and federal gun controls may be
constitutional, gun prohibitions are clearly
unconstitutional. The US Supreme Court has explicitly
protected an individual right to keep and bear arms,(51-56)
especially and explicitly protecting military-style weapons,
"part of the ordinary military equipment...."(56) Some have
erroneously believed that the Second Amendment reference to
"militia" designates only a right of the National Guard,
however, the National Guard is only one component of the
militia(57) because: "The militia of the United States
consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age...
and under 45 years of age."╨ United States Code, Title 10,
Section 311(a). Though the debate often focuses on the Second
Amendment, current and historical legal scholarship finds
support of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in the Ninth(58)
and Fourteenth Amendments(59,60) and natural rights
theory.(38)
   The constitutional authorities cited above and others are
quite convincing of the inherent, irrevocable right to self-
protection against criminals, rioters, and tyrants. The right
to keep and bear arms ╨ and ammunition ╨  is essential to
that self-protection and has nothing to do with duck hunting
or subjective assessments of "legitimate sporting uses" of
guns.
   Even if the Council could prove that assault weapons pose
a serious threat to public safety, it is doubtful that an
assault weapon ban would be upheld at the US Supreme Court
level, a process that may take several years. It seems a
waste of time, effort, and money for the Council to promote
an agenda of dubious (arguably counter-productive and
dangerous) efficacy and constitutionality.

   The approach essential to effective gun control

   The public policy debate should focus upon effectual and
constitutional measures that are supported by sound data. An
unbiased analysis of the Council's report must conclude that
they have made neither a careful, a complete, nor a
convincing case for an assault weapon ban. Instead of
attacking the actual roots of violence, the Council's effort
was misdirected against certain guns that, without good
reason, are symbols of violence. Though the villains in a few
sensationalized tragedies of the last decade, these guns have
legitimate, protected uses and are rarely used in crime.
   Responsible ownership of any kind of firearm by mentally
competent and law-abiding adults causes no social ill and
leaves no victims. For predatory criminals, however, there
should be inescapable punishment for violent crime regardless
of instrumentality. The demonstrated effectiveness of
mandatory prison sentencing for gun crimes evaporates when
bartered away in plea bargains.
   Two leading criminologists who have extensively studied
all aspects of gun issues, Kates and Kleck, advocate certain
gun controls, but not prohibition. They propose extending
certain effectual and constitutional controls and ╨ as
compromise ╨ repealing the ineffectual, the unattainable, or
the merely symbolic. As one example, they support the
mandatory check of all gun buyers at the point of sale to
prevent the transfer of weapons to criminals, incompetents,
and juveniles. Such checks could be accomplished as rapidly
and reliably as a credit card check. They value realistic,
attainable goals so they eschew utopian schemes that depend
upon producing gun scarcity in a nation that already has more
than 200 million guns. They emphasize that gun control is not
a panacea; only incremental improvements are
attainable.(4,61) Utopia is not an available solution to
violence in our society. The reader is referred to Kates and
Kleck for extended analysis.
   The enforceability of proposed controls should be given
adequate consideration. An overwhelming majority of law-
abiding California assault weapon owners have already
demonstrated their unwillingness to cooperate with an assault
weapon registration and ban.(62) Good citizens who recognize
a right to their weapons and who contemplate compliance with
registration schemes cannot be reassured by the confiscation
of weapons that has followed registrations in New York, New
Jersey, and Chicago. Intolerable police state tactics would
be necessary to obtain even marginal compliance ╨ too high a
price for too little benefit.
   Certain strategies and attitudes are counter-productive.
The incremental or "First Step" approach is perceived by gun
owners as "We'll take what we can get today, the rest we'll
take tomorrow." Such an approach makes gun owners unwilling
to make justifiable concessions for fear of approaching the
"slippery slope" that has led many nations towards the total
prohibition of guns.(63) The gun confiscations and
legislation, such as Congressman Owens' resolution to repeal
the Second Amendment, lead gun owners to believe they are
already on that "slippery slope." An undeserved pose of moral
superiority is a distraction from objective analysis and is.
therefore, an impediment to rational solutions. In the field
of guns, crime, and violence, organized medicine has much to
learn conceptually and methodologically from the
criminological, legal, and social science literature. In
these issues, organized medicine should adopt scientific
objectivity.

   Effectual solutions to criminal violence

   While an assault weapon ban may have appeared to the
Council to be a simple solution to America's epidemic of
violence, a scholarly review of the literature finds no
reliable data to support such a ban. Unfortunately the
Council's faulty call for prohibition may distract
legislators and the public from addressing effective methods
of controlling violence.
   Good evidence exists that violence in entertainment
contributes significantly towards violence in our
society.(64,65,66) That unwelcome contribution should be
minimized. In view of First Amendment protections we should
encourage voluntary restraint by an entertainment industry
cognizant of its ill effects on children. Parents should
exercise control over their children's viewing habits. The
misdirection of anger and frustration can be mitigated by
training.
   We should reassess national drug policies that make the
drug trade so attractively profitable that people will kill
to reap those profits. We should encourage the stabilization
of the American family. We must break the vicious circle of
violence, parent infecting child, that stems from the abuse
of children.
   HL Mencken observed that for every complex problem there
is a simple solution -- and it is wrong. Violence in our
society is a complex problem and gun prohibition is being
advanced as the simple solution -- and it is wrong. We must
not be side-tracked by the illusions of simplistic
"solutions."

   Acknowledgements

   The author is pleased to acknowledge the support of Mr.
Peter J. Kokalis and Col.╩Robert K. Brown for their
publication of a substantially similar article in the 1994
Fighting Firearms, an Omega Group, Ltd. publication, Boulder
CO 80306.
   The author is indebted for their review and helpful
suggestions to many including:

* Paul H. Blackman, PhD, Research Coordinator, National Rifle
Association, Institute for Legislative Action, Washington, DC
* James Boen, PhD, Assistant Dean for Academic Affairs,
Professor of Biostatistics, University of Minnesota, School
of Public Health, Minneapolis, Minnesota
* Robert Cottrol, JD, PhD, Associate Professor, Rutgers
School of Law, Camden, New Jersey
* Col. Martin Fackler, MD, Retired Chief, Wound Ballistics
Laboratory, Letterman Army Hospital, Presidio, San Francisco,
California
* Don B. Kates, Jr., JD, Former Constitutional Law Professor,
St. Louis University School of Law, Civil Rights Attorney,
Novato, California
* Gary Kleck, PhD, Professor of Criminology, Florida State
University, Tallahassee, Florida
* David Kopel, JD, Attorney, Independence Institute, Golden,
CO

   The author is, however, solely responsible for the content
of this paper.

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